Building Cooperative Partnerships to Enhance the
Global Maritime Partnership
By Mr. Tom Noble, Captain George Galdorisi (USN – retired) and Dr. Stephanie Hszieh
091013-N-2757S-080
YELLOW SEA (Oct. 13, 2009) The aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) transits and the Republic of Korea navy Aegis destroyer Sejong the Great (DDG KDX 991) during a bilateral exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jeffrey Stewart/Released)
Perspective
The U.S. Maritime Strategy and the Department of Defense’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review have placed the need to prevent and deter conflict at the same level as the military’s traditional duties to prevail in current conflicts. At the heart of this objective is the need to work “closely with our allies and partners to leverage existing alliances and create conditions to advance common interests.”1
For the U.S. Navy, this need for cooperation has its roots in the idea of a “1000-ship Navy” which later became known as the Global Maritime Partnership. Proposed for the first time by U.S. Chief of Naval Operations at the U.S. Navy’s International Seapower Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island in late 2005, this idea of a Global Maritime Partnership represents a stark recognition by the U.S. Navy that the world’s maritime fleets need to work together to guard against piracy, terrorism, catastrophic maritime incidents (such as South East Asian tsunami), and other security issues to maintain global maritime security.
Today, globalization and the presence of a new generation of threats on the high seas, the littorals, and the near-shore land areas, demands close cooperation between many navies whose collective goal is to maintain the rule of law on the global commons. But like globalization, rapid advances in technology – especially the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies – that link these navies together, present a challenge that must be reckoned with if these navies seek to achieve the interoperability necessary to operate together seamlessly at sea in peace and war.
Structuring International Cooperative Programs
In the Spring 2009 edition of Common Defense Quarterly, Captain Sam Tangredi recommended that the current administration enhance cooperative acquisition programs and cited the NATO’s Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) program as an excellent example of a cooperative acquisition program.2 While it is true that ESSM is an excellent example of an International Cooperative Program, all such programs are “custom fit” depending upon a broad set of considerations. This paper will examine some of the structures of cooperative programs and provide some “food for thought” for those considering a cooperative solution.
Almost all research, development, and acquisition programs differ due to requirements, state of technology, acquisition phase, funding, and industrial capability. Bringing such programs into international partnerships can add complexity, but it can also bring added investment, and may be the only way to accomplish the goal of bringing a complex weapons system from concept to ultimate fielding. For example, if we have a strategic goal of enhancing coalition warfighting capability, but a review of allied systems shows systems disparate from U.S. systems, how can we achieve the goal? Commonly there is no interest or money for our allies to do a wholesale change-out of nationally acquired systems just to make them compatible with U.S. systems. In such a case, addressing the goal may be done via cooperative work and information exchange using joint testing and shared development of hardware or software that provides a desired level of interoperability between the systems of interest.
Another common form of cooperation is leader/follower. On the international stage it is common for one country to lead an acquisition program and absorb the initial development risk and benefits. Other countries may be interested in the capability being developed, but do not have the funds or ability to fully share the program risks. This does not mean that investment in the program is impossible. It just means that the entire program is not shared. In such a case, co-investment in one aspect of the program may benefit all parties. An example would be an agreement that combines funds to allow testing to augment planned testing. Additional testing to build confidence and include allied requirements can lead to significant risk reduction and market expansion for a particular weapons system. In such a case, only the testing plans, participation, and results are shared (not the development or production information). Obviously testing is not the only phase where such an approach can work. Other examples include sharing in subsystem development or research of common architectures that define interoperability standards and interfaces for future national systems.
In the end many factors come into play when designing a cooperative program. The main consideration is “equitability” or fairness of the business plan for the cooperation. All parties must share the determination that the program is fair to their interests when all aspects of the cooperation are considered. This includes a shared objective, defined and identified funding, a well defined scope of work with clear definition of the contributions and shared results, a description of program management responsibilities (for the cooperation), and applicable contracting provisions.
So, what is the “ideal” model for an international cooperative program? The answer is “there isn’t one.” A model for an ESSM production agreement would not be a good model for a program that builds interoperability of disparate C4I systems. There is no “one size fits all.” For cooperative programs it is the “custom fit” of the contents of the cooperative agreement to a well-supported and fair program that sets the stage for success.
Conclusion
There was a time decades away when the essence of a “global maritime partnership” was essentially political and the U.S. Navy was large enough to take on most tasks singularly. Today, a substantially smaller U.S. Navy must partner with like-minded navies in war and peace.
Clearly, the U.S. Navy is committed to partnering with other navies to maintain the rule of law on the global commons and through cooperative development programs, especially C4I programs that enhance coalition networking.
But for the U.S. Navy, the technical challenges to effective networking with likely coalition partners are not trivial. The issue of co-evolution with coalition partners is an important one because for a U.S. Navy determined to be a global maritime partner, and not a naval power that dominates partners with U.S.-centric solutions, cooperative arrangements regarding technology development are crucial to long-term success.3 Allowing for variations in how cooperative programs are developed makes it possible for the co-evolution of technical solutions that will make the Global Maritime Partnership a reality.
References
- 1 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: DoD, 2010), page v.
- Sam J. Tangredi, “What The Obama Administration Should Do About International Security Cooperation,” Common Defense Quarterly (Spring 2009), http://commondefensequarterly.com/archives/CDQ1/obama.htm
- Gordon Van Hook, “How to Kill a Good Idea,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2007, page 33. Captain Van Hook, drawing on his experience as a destroyer squadron commander where he worked with coalition partners, emphasized the importance of a cooperative approach to instantiating the global maritime partnership, noting that the U.S. should; “Encourage regional maritime security arrangements to form at the grassroots level, without overt U.S. leadership.”
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