What The Obama Administration Should Do About International Security Cooperation
By Sam J. Tangredi, PhD
As with every incoming Presidential Administration, the Obama team has a chance to do things differently. Policies of a predecessor are sometimes easy to change (or improve), since previous personal commitment is not at stake. It should be even easier for a President who campaigned on a platform of “change you can believe in.”
Fundamental national interests, however, generally do not change. This is the “sometimes” part. They are the realities of a competitive international system; a system that professors often refer to as anarchic or simply as a self-help system. Anarchic does not mean a system of all against all. Rather it means that, ultimately, each state is responsible for its own survival. When push comes to shove, nations cannot and will not be defended by the staff of the United Nations organization or battalions of international lawyers. It doesn’t work that way.
But to further mutual objectives and forge a common defense, nations form alliances and partnerships. Perhaps the strongest and most amazing in history (in terms of its survivability) is NATO, along with it Asia-Pacific partners. Most of North America and Western Europe came together to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union. And NATO won without a major shooting war. The Cold War victory (some may find the term victory impolitic, but it is accurate) was truly a demonstration of the practical effects of international security cooperation, resulting from common procedures, common planning, and, to a considerable extent, common weapons systems.
With its result, one might think that the Cold War victory cemented broad awareness of the value and criticality of security cooperation in our anarchic world. But success often breeds complacency, and other factors, such as concern for the security of national technologies, intrudes deeply into the decision-making process. It is my view that this has happened to the United States Department of Defense (DoD) in recent years, although there are promising signs of renewal such as the new U.S. Navy-U.S. Marine Corps-U.S. Coast Guard strategic vision, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.
The new Obama Administration should follow up this renewed awareness of the centrality of security cooperation in the defense policies of the democracies by taking five practical steps to eliminate the most significant roadblocks to cooperative security: (1) reform International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and move their responsibility to the Department of Defense, (2) reform and simplify the U.S. technology release and transfer process, and create real fast tracks for U.S. allies, (3) rationalize the third party transfer policy, (4) increase funding and personnel support to cooperative programs, and (5) increase funding and opportunities for International Military Education and Training (IMET).
1. Reforming ITAR
The current form of ITAR, established by the Arms Export Control Act, is a relic of the Cold War era in which arms control was seen as preventing increased global militarization. That era is gone. Although control over the spread of advanced technologies to rogue states and potential adversaries is indeed very important, ITAR has become an impediment to technology sharing (especially computer code) with even America’s longest-standing allies. It has had a detrimental effect on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program and others.
The problem is that ITAR is structured to assume all defense technology transfers are inherently “bad,” and subjects allies and partners to the same approval processes as all other nations, as if they posed equal threats to American security. Although President Bush promised to create fast tracks for the UK and Australia (and potentially other partners), this has largely been stymied by members of Congress and a sluggish bureaucracy under the guise of protecting emerging new technologies. Of course, since complex modern weapons systems seem to require 10 or more years of program management until they are fully operational, what was initially an emerging technology is likely to be superseded by a newer advance. Less than friendly nations, such as Russia, which has few technology transfer controls, will likely duplicate the initial advantage in that timeframe—albeit not necessarily at the same level of quality.
The Obama Administration should seek to persuade Congress to rewrite the Arms Export Control Act, or, at the very least, push Congress to include fast tracks in the actual legislation. Once legislated, fast tracks would be transparent, subject to formal negotiation, and resist arbitrary interference.
At the same time, a rewritten Arms Export Control Act should transfer the responsibility of interpreting and enforcing ITAR from the Department of State to the DoD. Although the State Department would remain a participant in the interagency approval process, this change would streamline approval/disapproval because almost all of the ITAR decision-making happens within DoD, where the primary expertise resides (and is largely duplicated in the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs).
2. Reforming the Technology Transfer Process Within DoD
The DoD technology transfer process is biased in favor of not transferring or releasing technology. That is because the committees involved are not charged with the responsibility for making security cooperation succeed. International security cooperation is neither their charter nor interest. Their interest lies in preserving America’s lead in defense technologies and ensuring that advanced weapons do not fall into the hands of potential adversaries, both clearly worthy and critical responsibilities. But it is an unbalanced approach. It is an inherently adversarial approach. In matters of technology transfer, they are security cooperation skeptics and their default answer is “no.”
It is the task of DoD organizations assigned to furthering security cooperation—such as the Navy International Program Office (as one example)—to convince the skeptics that transfer of a particular technology or system will not substantially harm America’s defense posture nor reduce its technical advantage. This is not an easy task. Even technologies that are shared with a staunch ally might leak to others. Leaking out of U.S. hands is one thing; it is not a black eye for the whole principle of security cooperation. But leaking out of a partner’s hands is something else entirely. From the skeptics’ point of view, such an incident would validate the inherent dangers of security cooperation. It takes determination by proponents of security cooperation and possibly years of effort to convince them otherwise.
The technology release and transfer process should be reformed so that the decision-making participants are charged with both the security of America’s defense technology and the success of international security cooperation. Their deliberations should acknowledge the fact that security cooperation—particularly with staunch allies ready to go to war alongside the United States—is as important, and in selected cases, may be more important, than the absolute, irrefutable, and risk-free approach to technology security. They should think in terms of technology sharing, not technology transfer, acknowledging that there may be technical benefits to allowing partners full cooperation in program development, and that the close allies are as interested in ensuring the technology does not leak as they are. It should be remembered that in the Second World War, much of the cryptological code-breaking equipment and procedures that helped in winning the war were transferred from the United Kingdom to the United States.
If changing the charters of the technology security committees is considered undesirable, then every new U.S. system development program should include designed export variants--that represent acceptable levels of technology release—from the very initiation of each program.
3. Rationalizing and Allowing Anticipated Third Party Transfers
The routine development of export variants may solve partner disputes over third party transfers. For most partners, the requirement for U.S. approval prior to transferring U.S.-originated technology to other nations is understandable. The problem is not the need for approval (although that does seem to affect some partner’s sensitivities), but the fact that the approval process takes far too long to move through the bureaucracies involved. There are examples of the transfer of ten-year old decommissioned ships of one U.S. partner to another U.S. partner (a security cooperation endeavor) being delayed while the U.S. bureaucracy decides whether the resulting transfer of 20-year old U.S.-developed technology poses a national threat.
Third party transfers between long-standing U.S. partners should be anticipated and approved in the shortest possible time. Perhaps the transfer of ITAR responsibilities to DoD would facilitate this. In any event, the eventual third-party transfer of technology should be part of the planning for new acquisition programs. If more robust anti-tamper features are required, they should be designed into the systems from the start, not added with great time delay and expense after technology transfer criteria is finally approved. This should apply to all technology transfers, but especially with the acknowledgement that eventual third party transfers (to non-hostile nations) are practically inevitable in an effective security cooperation regime.
4. Enhancing Cooperative Acquisition Programs
As concerns technology, cooperative acquisition programs in which multiple partners pool their advanced design and production capabilities to produce a common system is the penultimate form of cooperative security. In naval systems, an outstanding example is NATO’s Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) program.
Part of the incentive for nations to participate in cooperative programs is the resulting economies of scale, as well as benefitting from partners’ technical capabilities. The resulting reduction in cost is as of much benefit to the United States as its partners. In an era of astronomically expensive weapons systems and reductions in defense budgets, eliminating costs (particularly non-recurring research and development costs) should be of great interest to DoD.
But as the old adage goes, “you have to spend some money to make (or save) money.” More importantly, you have to demonstrate firm commitment to the success of cooperative programs. DoD needs to spend more money and more planning time on developing and sustaining cooperative programs. This may require an increase in personnel managing cooperative programs (as long as it does not produce a time wasting bureaucracy).
Moreover, the weapons systems under development should be placed in a special security cooperation category and not be subject to Service budget decision-making as if they were equivalent to national domestic programs. Cancellation of or reduction in a domestic weapons system program may have a lot of ramifications, but does not necessarily affect the strength of a critical international security alliance.
This is not an argument for preserving international programs at the expense of domestic programs. Rather, it is an argument for the recognition that the value of participating in international programs may be even more significant than the strict cost/benefit value of the product under development. As another adage maintains, “goodwill is immeasurable.” But in cooperative program decision-making, we most always keep the value of good will in mind.
5. Increasing the Scope and Level of Participation of International Military Education and Training (IMET)
Anyone who has thoroughly studied the effects of international security cooperation knows that it is training and education, not technology transfer, which truly develops “the ties that bind.” The U.S. DoD has long maintained that it is the quality and training of its personnel, not the quality of its technological systems, that is the most critical for victory. This is also true for allied and coalition forces.
DoD should increase the amount of money spent on IMET—another program ostensibly under the control of the Department of State—and direct the Services to establish training course specifically designed for partner personnel. In addition, more mobile training teams should be established and utilized. In recent years, it has been the U.S. Marine Corps that has made the greatest efforts in this regard.
The U.S. should double the amount of openings for foreign students at academies, war colleges, and advanced education courses. After 1991, openings were increased to accommodate students from Eastern Europe and former Soviet Republics. But more can be done. Costs for participating partners could be minimized by payments in kind, such as equal numbers of U.S. personnel assignment to partner educational institutions and staffs.
Creative improvements could be attempted, such as allowing partner nations to send newly enlisted personnel to American boot camps. In any event, it is my view that the current level of IMET funding and participation is not commensurate with the level of positive payoffs in furthering long-range security cooperation.
The Obama Administration has a chance to strengthen U.S. participation in international security cooperation and place it in the forefront of U.S. defense strategy, rather than as an adjunct. There are five (relatively) simple reforms to existing procedures that would greatly enhance the depth and benefits of security cooperation. In the case of technology transfer, these reforms would demonstrate trust in close partners and eliminate the additional expense and delay that appear to be inevitable results of the current decision-making process. But it would also acknowledge the reality that defense technology never stands still. In many defense acquisition programs, cutting-edge technology—that which really needs to protected—has moved on by the time the final products are fielded by partner nations.
There needs to be a balance between the desire for a high level of technology security and the implied treaty commitments to share modern technology with nations committed to mutual defense. Otherwise, we arrive at conditions similar to today: U.S. allies may not be able to effectively interact with modern U.S. combat units. Defense planners bemoan the fact that U.S. communication, command and control, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities have advanced so far beyond those of its partners, that it is difficult to share real time operational data with them. This situation makes some skeptical of the very value of allied or coalition participation in U.S.-led operations. But it is an inevitable result of America’s current approach to international security cooperation.
That approach needs to be reformed. Even if the above suggestions prove too radical to implement, the U.S. government must take streamlining, establishment of fast tracks, and the elimination of bureaucratic delays in technology release and transfer seriously, not simply give it lip service. The simple change of tightly coordinating the convening of the numerous technology transfer approval committees, and establishing a firm timeline for that process would result in a significant reduction in delay and expense.
Even in a self-help international system, technology security itself has never won a war. Capable and committed allies have. If cooperative security is truly to be the mainstay of America’s strategic vision, we must “walk the walk.” Improvements in our approach to international security cooperation should be a priority for the Obama Administration.
Dr. Sam J. Tangredi is the Director of San Diego Operations for Strategic Insight LTD. A Captain, U.S. Navy retired from active duty, Tangredi’s last military assignment was as the first Director of the Strategic Planning and Business Development Directorate of the Navy International Programs Office. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect the corporate or official views of Strategic Insight or the U.S. Department of Defense.
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